Metaphysics of science, in particular laws of nature
Philosophy of physics, in particular quantum physics and space-time relationalism
Philosophy of mind, in particular mental causation, freedom and the relationship between naturalism and normativity
Book project: Science and freedom
The first philosophy book I read was Karl Popper’s The open society and its enemies. The central aim of the present book project is to bring out how science makes us free and thereby contributes to the open society. This contribution is threatened today by two misconceptions of science: on the one hand, there is the mistake to assume that science can give us the norms to design society and our individual lives – a mistake that originates in Marxism and that is fuelled today by a misapprehension of the discoveries in evolutionary biology, genetics, cognitive science, etc. On the other hand, there is the refusal to recognize that science discovers truth, which is widespread among postmodernist intellectuals and which invites abandoning the demarcation line between fact and fake.
Accordingly, this book will show what is wrong with the widespread claims to the effect that scientific laws (such as, for instance, deterministic laws in physics), scientific discoveries (such as, for instance, discoveries in genetics or cognitive science) and scientific explanations (such as, for instance, explanations of human behaviour in evolutionary biology) infringe upon human free will. In brief, scientific laws, discoveries and explanations are about contingent facts by contrast to something that is necessary (that is, that could not have been otherwise). Consequently, science can give us orientations, but not norms, neither for the individual life, nor for society – on pain of committing what is known as the naturalistic fallacy (that is, the attempt to deduce norms from contingent facts). Science makes us free in that it shows that we have the freedom to set up the norms for our life – as individuals as well as in societies –, but thereby also the burden of the responsibility for our actions.
In a broader perspective, this book is an essay on the interplay between what Wilfrid Sellars called the scientific image of the world and the manifest image of the world. It recalls the good reasons for taking the scientific image to be the complete image of the world, that is, to consider also persons as being fully accessible to scientific enquiry. But it also stresses the good reasons for giving priority to persons and to put the scientific image in a frame that is set by the manifest image. The point that this book seeks to make is this one: whatever is the truth about the world and our place in it, in both cases – the one starting from science as well as the one starting from persons –, we get to human freedom. The central issue then is how to use the resources of both the scientific and the manifest image of the world to shape the norms that enable our freedom to develop, both with respect to individuals as well as for societies.
Current Research (with collaborators, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation) Naturalized metaphysics as minimalist ontology of the natural world
In any theory of the world, some things are regarded as fundamental, whereas all the other things in the domain of the theory then come in as being derived (or explained) in terms of the fundamental things. What is endorsed as fundamental should be as sparse as possible – the more parsimonious the basic ontological commitments are, the greater is their explanatory power (although the explanations will be longer the lesser notions are admitted as basic). When it comes to finding out what is fundamental about the natural world, it is reasonable to turn to physics. That is the idea of naturalized metaphysics, that is, metaphysics informed by the natural sciences, in contrast to metaphysics done from the armchair. In that spirit, the question about the fundamental can be formulated in this way: What are the minimal ontological commitments that are sufficient in order to understand what physics tells us about the world? The idea that this project pursues is that the following two axioms constitute such a minimal ontological commitment: (1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. Working this idea out requires on the one hand the elaboration of a detailed argument of how the physics as we know it can be recovered on such a sparse basis. This research focuses on relationalism about space-time and the structural individuation of objects with respect to both relativistic and quantum physics (as well as the relationship between the two). On the other hand, it requires elaborating on a theory of laws of nature and explanations that fits with these minimal ontological commitments. This research does so by pursuing (Super-)Humeanism, arguing that any further ontological commitments do not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to new problems. Last but not least, against this background, this research also seeks to work out where the limits of science and scientific explanation thus conceived lie, for instance, when it comes to free will or the mind in general.
"A philosophical enquiry into a parsimonious ontology of the natural world", November 2017 to November 2021, with Andrea Oldofredi (Postdoc), Federico Benitez (PhD student) and Frida Trotter (PhD student).
"The Metaphysics of Physics: Natural Philosophy", November 2013 to November 2016, with Antonio Vassallo (Postdoc), Andrea Oldofredi (PhD student) and Davide Romano (PhD student).
“Causal properties and laws in the philosophy of science”, October 2010 to September 2015, with Pietro Snider (PhD student, Oct. 2010 to June 2012), Jakob Sprickerhof (PhD student, March 2011 to Sept. 2012) and Mario Hubert (PhD student from Jan. 2013 to Sept. 2015) (project within the ProDoc “Mind and reality”).
“Structural realism as a philosophy of nature”, May 2009 to September 2013, with Vincent Lam (Postdoc) (until 1 March 2010) and Tim Raez (PhD student) (1 March 2010- 30 September 2013), PhD thesis defended 2 December 2013.
“Direct realism and the threat from perceptual delusions”, August 2008 to July 2011, with Michael Sollberger (PhD-student), PhD thesis defended 12 November 2010.
“Mental causation, functionalism and the metaphysics of causation”, December 2007 to November 2010, with Patrice Soom (PhD-student) (project within the ProDoc “Mind, normativity, self and properties”), PhD thesis defended 15 October 2010. “Mental causation and reductionism”, October 2004 to September 2007, with Jens Harbecke and Christian Sachse, PhD theses defended 13 February and 4 September 2007.
Funded by the Cogito Foundation "The fundamental ontology of the natural world", December 2015 to July 2017, with Dustin Lazarovici (Postdoc).
Funded by the Programme Collaborative Research on Science and Society (CROSS) EPFL-UNIL “The quantum state as the memory of a quantum system”, January to December 2014, with Vincenzo Savona (EPFL) and Antonio Vassallo (Postdoc).
Frida Trotter, Theoretical observation, since December 2017.
Federico Benitez Conte, Consistent metaphysical analysis of fundamental physical theories, since December 2017.
Dustin Lazarovici, Typicality and the metaphysics of laws, since September 2017.
Cristian López, The problem of the arrow of time in the micro-world, co-supervision with Olimpia Lombardi (Buenos Aires), since June 2017.
Tiziano Ferrando, Structure and ontology, since February 2015.
Davide Romano,The emergence of the classical world from a Bohmian universe, Thesis defended 19 November 2016.
Andrea Oldofredi, Particle creation and annihilation: Bohmian approaches. A metaphysical inquiry into the ontology of quantum field theory, Thesis defended 19 November 2016, co-direction with Nino Zanghì (Genova).
Mario Hubert, Particles and laws of nature in classical and quantum physics, Thesis defended 18 November 2016.
Laurent Cordonier, Sociologie et sciences de la nature humaine. Une approche intégrative, Thesis defended 19 December 2016, co-supervision with Laurence Kaufmann (SSP-UNIL).
Pietro Snider, Causation and the self-constitution of the conscious mind, Thesis defended 26 October 2015, co-supervision with Markus Wild (Basel).
Marion Hämmerli, Parts, places, and perspectives: A theory of spatial relations based on mereotopology and convexity, Thesis defended 3 July 2014, co-supervision with Achille Varzi (Columbia University, New York); Prix de la Faculté des lettres.
Tim Räz, On the applicability of mathematics—philosophical and historical perspectives, Thesis defended 2 December 2013.
Antonio Vassallo, The metaphysics of quantum gravity: a causal approach, Thesis defended 22 July 2013.
Matthias Egg, Causal explanations and unobservable entities in particle physics, Thesis defended 12 October 2012.
Michael Sollberger, The structural nature of perception, Thesis defended 12 November 2010.
Patrice Soom, From psychology to neuroscience. A new reductive account, Thesis defended 15 October 2010.
Georg Sparber, Unorthodox Humeanism, Thesis defended 3 December 2008.
Vincent Lam, Space-time within general relativity: a stuctural realist understanding, Thesis defended 30 November 2007; Prix de la Faculté des lettres.
Jens Harbecke, Mental causation. Investigating the mind’s powers in a natural world, Thesis defended 4 September 2007.
Christian Sachse, Reductionism in the philosophy of science, Thesis defended 13 February 2007; Prix de la Société académique vaudoise 2007.